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BANKRUPTING TRIBES: AN EXAMINATION OF TRIBAL
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AS REPARATION IN THE
CONTEXT OF SECTION 106(A)
ABSTRACT
This Comment concerns section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code, which
abrogates sovereign immunity of “a State, a Commonwealth, a District, a
Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other foreign or domestic
government.” A circuit split exists as to whether this section applies to Native
Nations. The Sixth Circuit interpreted this section to maintain sovereign
immunity for Native Nations in the Code, while the Ninth Circuit interpreted it
to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity. This Comment argues that the Sixth
Circuit’s interpretation of section 106(a) is the correct interpretation because
of the unique relationship between Native Nations and the federal government.
This Comment first reviews the history between the federal government and
Native Nations to explore this unique relationship and to establish a reparative
legislative history. It then compares tribal immunity to other forms of sovereign
immunity in order to establish Native sovereign immunity as unique and to
demonstrate congressional intent to exclude Native Nations from section 106(a).
Finally, it argues that tribal sovereign immunity should be maintained in the
context of the Code because the renewed sovereign status of Native Nations and
the privileges associated with that sovereign status are reparations efforts and
therefore deserve significant weight in any calculus that considers the
weakening of sovereign privileges.
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INTRODUCTION
The relationship between the United States federal government and Native
Nations is one most emblematized by its uniqueness. “The United States is the
only country in the world to recognize the inherent sovereignty of Native
Nations within its borders and to recognize the ability of Native Nations to
regulate and govern reservation lands.”1 The legal relationship that they share is
considered sui generis in public law.2 The unique relationship between the
federal government and Native Nations has informed the doctrines around which
tribal governments legally interact with the state and federal governments of the
United States, including the doctrine of tribal immunity.3 Tribal immunity is
separate and unique from both the sovereign immunity employed by states
within the legal framework of the United States and by foreign nations within
the context of legal proceedings in the United States.4 This means that tribal
immunity can defend a tribe from suit in contexts where state sovereign
immunity would not protect a state.5 One such context is the application of
sovereign immunity under section 106(a) of the Bankruptcy Code.
Section 106(a) states that “notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign
immunity, sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the
extent set forth in this section with regard to the following . . . .”6 To understand
whose sovereign immunity is abrogated by this section, one must consult the
definitions section of the Code. This section defines the term “governmental
unit” as “[the] United States; State; Commonwealth; District; Territory;
municipality; foreign state; department, agency or instrumentality of the United
States (but not a United States trustee in a case under this title), a State, a
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign state; or other
foreign or domestic government.”7
1
Maggie Blackhawk, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1789,
1796 (2019).
2
Sui generis, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (“Of its own kind or class; unique or
peculiar”); see Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1863.
3
Tribal immunity is the sovereign immunity given to Native Nations. The unique name assigned to this
form of sovereign immunity further exemplifies that it is separate and apart from other forms of sovereign within
the United States jurisprudence. See In re Greektown Holdings LLC, 917 F.3d 451, 465–66 (6th Cir. 2019);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 16 (1831) (arguing that “the condition of the Indians in relation to the
United States is perhaps unlike that of any other two people in existence.”).
4
See In re Greektown Holdings, 917 F.3d at 465–66; Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak, 501 U.S.
775, 786 (1991). Compare Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996) (stating that tribal immunity may
be abrogated wherever Congress sees fit), with U.S. CONST. amend. 11.
5
See In re Greektown Holdings, 917 F.3d at 465–66.
6
11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2019).
7
Id. § 101(27).
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Only two federal circuit courts have considered the issue of the treatment of
tribal immunity in the context of section 106(a), and these courts reached
markedly different conclusions.8 In the more recent case, Buchwald Capital
Advisors, LLC, the Sixth Circuit held that section 101(27) of the Code did not
explicitly mention tribal governments as “governmental units” whose sovereign
immunity was abrogated.9 The Court determined that the tribe retained its
sovereign immunity and that it did not waive this right in adversary proceedings
simply by filing a bankruptcy petition.10 Accordingly, the case was dismissed.11
Conversely, in Krystal Energy Company, the Ninth Circuit held that section
106(a) explicitly revoked tribal sovereign immunity for matters within the Code
because tribes were “domestic governments” and therefore fell under the
umbrella of “governmental units” as defined by section 101(27).12 The circuit
split on this issue has yet to be clarified by the Supreme Court.13 Without
clarification the issue lacks national uniformity, which makes it difficult for both
Native Nations and their creditors to make decisions about how to approach
bankruptcy.
While only two federal circuit courts have considered this issue, recent case
law from lower federal courts around the treatment of tribal immunity in the
context of section 106(a) demonstrates a modern trend towards maintaining
tribal immunity. In In re Whitaker, the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate
Panel affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to maintain sovereign immunity
for both the Lower Sioux Indian Community and its subsidiary, Dakota Finance
Corporation.14 The Lower Sioux Indian Community and the Dakota Finance
Corporation owed debtors in a bankruptcy case tribal revenue payments in
accordance with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.15 The trustee of the
bankruptcy estate sought to garnish the revenues of the tribe and its subsidiary
for the benefit of the estate and its creditors.16 The court held that the trustee was
prevented from doing so because the sovereign immunity of the Lower Sioux

8
Compare Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1055, 1056–58 (9th Cir. 2004), with In re
Greektown Holdings, 917 F.3d at 462.
9
In re Greektown Holdings, 917 F.3d at 462.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Krystal Energy Co., 357 F.3d at 1057.
13
Compare id., with In re Greektown Holdings, 917 F.3d at 462.
14
In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687, 689 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012).
15
Id.
16
Id.
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Indian Community was not abrogated by section 106(a) and that this sovereign
immunity extended to the tribe’s subsidiary.17
Similarly, in Subranni, the bankruptcy court for the District of New Jersey
held that a newspaper organized under the Navajo Nation Corporation Code
could assert the privilege of sovereign immunity against a bankruptcy trustee
who sought to recover preferential transfers made to the newspaper.18 The court
held that section 106(a) did not include the Navajo Nation within the list of
governmental units whose sovereign immunity was abrogated.19 Cases decided
within the last ten years by lower courts favor the preservation of tribal immunity
in the context of the Code. This modern trend weighs in favor of the
interpretation of section 106(a) that is advocated in this Comment.
The modern trend of maintaining tribal immunity within the context of the
Code is the correct interpretation of section 106(a) because precedent,
congressional intent, and the historical relationship between the federal
government and Native Nations favor it. The courts who have ruled this way
focus on the language of section 101(27) and canons of statutory construction
for support.20 Occasionally these courts will turn to congressional intent in the
context of the Indian Reorganization Act to justify their holding.21 While these
are legitimate arguments, they lack a comprehensive understanding of the
complexities of the relationship between Native Nations and the federal
government and how this history informs the doctrine of tribal immunity.
Neither side of the debate comprehensively discusses the history of violence
against Native Nations and the trend in federal Indian law towards righting those
injustices. By failing to consider the full history, these courts weaken the
doctrine of tribal immunity because they fail to qualify it as a form of reparations
that encourages fairness and justice in the law.
Courts should hold that tribes retain sovereign immunity under section
106(a) of the Code. The language of the statute and the history between the
United States government and Native Nations do not indicate an intention by
Congress to abrogate tribes’ sovereign immunity; additionally, Congress
explicitly expressed an intention to encourage the political and economic growth
of Native Nations, and tribal immunity can operate as a form of reparations for

17

Id. at 694–97.
Subranni v. Navajo Times Publ’g Co., 568 B.R. 616, 624 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2016).
19
Id.
20
See, e.g., id. at 616; In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. 687 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012); In re Greektown Holdings,
LLC, 917 F.3d 451 (6th Cir. 2019).
21
See In re Whitaker, 474 B.R. at 689.
18
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atrocities committed against Native populations. For purposes of this Comment,
“reparations” is defined with a three-prong test: “recognizing and accepting
responsibility for historic injustice; repairing present-day damage traceable to
past injustice; and building productive group relationships.”22 This perspective
on the law is correct because it is supported by precedent and legal argument
and because it promotes justice by propelling Native Nations towards economic
prosperity.
To reach this conclusion, this Comment will first focus on the history of
federal Indian law, the establishment of tribal immunity, and how tribal
immunity compares to other forms of sovereign immunity. Second, it will
explore the application of tribal immunity to section 106(a) and address
fundamental misunderstandings of tribal immunity. Finally, it will focus on the
maintenance of tribal sovereign immunity within the Code as a form of
reparations and will confront the effects this may have on the future of
bankruptcy in the United States.
I.

THE BIRTH OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
TRIBAL IMMUNITY

This Section will confront the history of the United States government’s
interaction with Native Nations. It will emphasize the sovereign status of Native
peoples and how that sovereignty was slowly weakened by the federal
government. Finally, it will review the history of tribal sovereign immunity and
begin to compare it to other forms of sovereign immunity recognized by the
federal government in order to establish it as unique.
A. Tribal Immunity: A History
1. Establishing a Nation Amid the “Indian Threat”
Tribal sovereign immunity was not accidental, but rather was an evolution
of common law over years of interactions with the five “civilized” Native
Nations23 that the United States recognized as sovereign and independent.24 The

22
Eric K. Yamamoto, Sandra Hye Yun Kim & Abigail M. Holdin, American Reparations Theory and
Practice at the Crossroads, 44 CAL. W. L. REV. 1, 31 (2007).
23
William Wood, It Wasn’t an Accident: The Tribal Sovereign Immunity Story, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 1587,
1627 (2013) (stating that the United States recognized the Chickasaw, Muscogee, Choctaw, Cherokee and
Seminole nations as civilized due to governmental structures that were relatively congruous to those of Western
nations at the time).
24
Id. at 1622.
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recognition of the sovereignty of Native Nations was a trend within the federal
government since its inception. Tribal sovereignty predates the formation of the
United States; Native Nations were viewed as autonomous by European colonial
powers prior to the American revolution.25 Colonies from England, France and
Spain respected the independence of tribal governments in economic markets
and political treaties.26 The British Crown bought titles to lands from tribes,
inherently recognizing the tribes’ right to ownership over that land.27 British
recognition was central to colonial efforts to secure control over southeast trade,
which was quickly becoming a booming market.28 Even after the United States
won its independence, political treaties securing trade in the area were pervasive
as the new nation grappled with the French, Spanish and British presence in the
area for economic dominance.29
The freshly independent nation established the Articles of Confederation as
its guiding document, but the document’s articulations of powers around
relationships with Native Nations were ambiguous.30 Although the Articles gave
the federal government the power to create treaties with Indian tribes, there were
few institutions in place to compel compliance.31 The federal government
depended on appeals to the states to observe the provisions of treaties that it had
signed with these tribes, but states denied the legitimacy of these treaties and the
legitimacy of the federal government’s power to create them.32 These ambiguous
definitions, as well as inadequate executive power, led to broken treaties and
unauthorized wars with Native Nations and served as a major factor in the
decision to hold a Constitutional Committee in order to draft a more articulate
and powerful national document.33
At the Constitutional Convention, two attitudes towards the Native
populations emerged: a paternalistic view supported by Madison34 and a
25
Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under Federal
Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty,
37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 683 (2002).
26
Wood, supra note 23, at 1624.
27
Seielstad, supra note 25, at 684.
28
Wood, supra note 23, at 1624.
29
Wood, supra note 23, at 1625–26.
30
Blackhawk, supra note 1, 1807.
31
See Gregory Ablavsky, The Savage Constitution, 63 DUKE L.J. 999, 1018 (2014).
32
Id. at 1037.
33
Id. at 1036–37.
34
Id. at 1045 (quoting 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1744–1789, at 340–41 (John C.
Fitzpatrick ed., 1933) (“The utmost good faith should always be observed towards the Indians, their lands and
property shall bever be taken from them without their consent; and, in their property, rights and liberty, they
shall never be invaded or disturbed, unless in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress . . . .”)).
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militaristic approach to Indian affairs supported by Hamilton.35 The Constitution
was not gaining the support among states that it needed, so in the interest of
expediency, the Hamiltonian view was adopted. The Federalist rhetoric around
Native populations painted them as a “savage threat” that a strong, centralized
federal government with a funded military would be able to combat.36 This
rhetoric and imagery was important to secure ratification from the Southern
States, specifically Georgia.37
Although the Constitutional Congress denigrated tribal communities to
secure popularity for a powerful federal government, it also recognized Native
Nations as separate and sovereign from the United States.38 Native populations
are hardly mentioned in the U.S. Constitution, but when they are, it is clear that
they hold a unique position in relation to the federal government. The
Constitution empowers Congress to “regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes[,]”39 clearly
distinguishing tribal nations from both states and foreign nations.40
The Federalist rhetoric around Native Nations was militaristic, but after a
federal government was established, the Washington administration chose to
treaty with surrounding tribes.41 The peaceful approach to relationships with
Native Nations was not appreciated by the Southern States, who felt that they
had been tricked into signing the Constitution with false promises of a federally
waged war against Indian tribes.42 However, the newly ratified Constitution
vocalized that Indian affairs were a federal issue, and the Washington
administration acted in accordance. The administration turned to international
law for resolution of issues between the newly formed United States and Native
Nations. The use of international law principles shows that the United States
government considered Native Nations to be sovereign and distinct from the
United States.43
35

Id. at 1007.
Id. at 1007–08.
37
Id.
38
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1808; see U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
39
U.S. CONST. art. I, §8.
40
See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 18 (1831).
41
Ablavsky, supra note 31, at 1073.
42
Ablavsky, supra note 31, at 1073.
43
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1809 (“The Washington Administration recognized Native Nations as
‘foreign nations, not as the subjects of any particular state’ and in possession of ‘full, undivided and independent
sovereignty as long as they chose to keep it, and that this might be forever.’”); see Sarah W. Conkright,
Comment, The “Better Reading” of Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act: A Rejection of Automatic
Waiver of Tribal Immunity in Memphis Biofuels, 60 CATH. U. L. REV. 1175, 1179 (2011) (discussing how the
founders’ use of treaties with Native Nations implies elements of sovereignty for those tribes).
36
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The early recognition of the sovereignty of Native Nations lends credence to
the doctrine of tribal immunity because all forms of sovereign immunity are
direct results of the sovereign status of any governmental structure.44 The
sovereignty of Native peoples existed before the creation of an independent
American nation. Recognition of this reality demonstrates that the doctrine of
tribal immunity is not an accidental or recently constructed concept as some
courts have argued.45 Rather, it is tied to the sovereignty of the Native peoples,
and that sovereignty has existed since the birth of the American nation.
2. Manifest Destiny and the Push Westward
While the Washington administration held a relative respect for the
autonomy of Native Nations, this attitude did not last. As the push west began,
“issues of Indian policy and Indian removal received more attention in the
nation’s periodicals than did issues of tariffs and the Bank of the United
States.”46 The Congressional Committee on Indian Affairs released a statement
that Native Nations were the aggressors in colonial wars and that, as such, they
should atone for those wars by giving their land to the United States.47
While federal attitudes towards Native peoples began to change, so too did
the political activities of Native Nations. In 1826, the Choctaws passed their first
Constitution and in 1829, the Chickasaw adopted a code of written laws to
improve administration and in response to a growing public judiciary.48 In fact,
by the early 1830s, the Cherokee nation had “a bicameral legislature, a judicial
system with various districts and appeals courts, and a national police force.”49
The tribes had a highly organized and advanced governmental structure,
contrary to the “savage” hunter-gatherer depiction so often expressed in United
States history and media. Native Nations decided to change their governmental
structure in response to the growing presence of the United States and to
establish Native authority over the lands they held. The Southern States
perceived these changes as threats to their power and, as such, wanted aggressive
action to be taken.50

44

See In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1992).
Wood, supra note 23, at 1589 (citations omitted).
46
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1795 (quoting Mary Hershberger, Mobilizing Women, Anticipating
Abolition: The Struggle Against Indian Removal in the 1830s, 86 J. AM. HISTORIANS 15, 17 (1999)).
47
Ablavsky, supra note 31, at 1017–18.
48
Wood, supra note 23, at 1627–28.
49
Wood, supra note 23, at 1630.
50
Wood, supra note 23, at 1627–28.
45
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The decisions from the three cases that made up the Marshall trilogy
supported this ethos.51 These three cases are recognized as the beginning of
Federal Indian Law in the United States.52 They provided justification for
Westward expansion that the federal government used to rationalize a system of
structural violence against native populations.53 Rather than justifying federal
violence through the Constitutional powers granted to the executive powers of
the federal government, the Marshall trilogy justified it through a courtsanctioned doctrine of discovery, a concept of national power inherent to the
notion of establishing American sovereignty.54 The Supreme Court justified
violent actions against native populations based on this ethnocentric view that
European nations could claim native lands because they discovered and utilized
them, while the native populations lived as hunter-gatherers, never truly
establishing a respectable society.55 This doctrine seems to justify Andrew
Jackson’s Trail of Tears, the robbing of Native children from their families for
placement in assimilation schools, and other models of structural violence aimed
at destabilizing and destroying Native culture.
The Marshall trilogy dehumanized Native Nations, and the holdings were
used to justify the taking of Native lands, but these cases still acknowledged a
level of tribal sovereignty—an important factor in the future formulation of
sovereign privileges.56 In Worcester v. Georgia, the Supreme Court reinforced
that states did not have jurisdiction over Native Nations, and in his opinion,
Marshall stated that the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community, occupying
its own territory . . . in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which
the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter, but with the assent of the
Cherokees themselves.”57
Jurisdiction over Native Nations belonged exclusively to the federal
government, and in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, Marshall acknowledged the
unique relationship between the tribal governments and the United States.58 He
wrote “the condition of the Indians in relation to the United States is perhaps

51
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831); Worcester v.
Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
52
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17–18.
53
See id. 15–18.
54
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1818.
55
See Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1818; see also Wood, supra note 23, at 1627–28 (discussing how this
view of Native Nations is incorrect; governmental structures of many of the largest Native tribes were actually
very complex).
56
See Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–17.
57
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 560–61 (1832).
58
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 16–18.
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unlike that of any other two people in existence.”59 It was well established at the
time that “the Constitution neither speaks of [tribal nations] as states or foreign
states, but as just what they were, Indian Tribes.”60 Marshall recognized the
Cherokee Nation “as a state, as a distinct political society,” and noted that “[t]he
acts of our government plainly recognize the Cherokee nation as a state, and the
courts are bound by those acts.”61 He also commented that the Cherokee Nation
was not foreign to the United States:62
[Native Nations] are considered by foreign nations, as well as by
ourselves, as being so completely under the sovereignty and dominion
of the United States, that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form
a political connexion [sic] with them, would be considered by all as an
invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.63

In these opinions, Marshall recognized Native tribes as neither states nor foreign
governments, but as a unique blend that was domestic to the United States, but
separate and sovereign from it. The sui generis relationship between the federal
government and Native Nations demonstrates that it may be possible for
Congress to pass legislation in section 106(a) that abrogates sovereign immunity
for all governments except those of Native Nations.
It is important to note that all three cases in the Marshall trilogy revolved
around the Cherokee Nation. The Supreme Court saw the Cherokee Nation as
more civilized than other tribes,64 primarily due to its bicameral legislature and
established judicial system.65 In addition to a governmental structure that
appealed to Western society, at the time of the decision, the Cherokee Nation
had a literacy rate higher than that of the states that surrounded it and published
a newspaper in both English and Cherokee that was read internationally.66 These
markers made the Cherokee Nation more respectable to the federal government,
and the Supreme Court was willing to grant the nation the title of sovereign—a
title that would influence the development of the rest of federal Indian law. It is
also important to recognize the complexity and authority of Native governments
because it informs the concept of reparations. Reparations for the destruction of
these societies ought not simply support Native people; rather, they should strive

59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66

Id. at 16.
Id. at 27 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
Wood, supra note 23, 1629–30.
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17, 19.
Id. at 17–18.
Wood, supra note 23, at 1630.
Ablavsky, supra note 31, at 1036–37.
Wood, supra note 23, at 1630.
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to return those societies to the same power that they held before the systematic
violence that the federal government perpetrated against them.
Even after the Western expansion pushed the tribes out of their lands in the
Southeast, the five tribes negotiated treaties with the United States that
guaranteed fee simple ownership of the new lands in the West and continued
recognition of tribal authority and sovereignty over those lands.67 After being
forced to move to the West, the Native Nations that already wrote Constitutions
amended them, and those that had not written Constitutions formulated them.68
This governmental structure is why the United States recognized these tribes as
“civilized,” and this recognition influenced the tribal sovereign immunity
doctrine.69
The Marshall trilogy also reinforced that issues between native tribes and
any part of the United States were the exclusive jurisdiction of the federal
government and he began to define that relationship. In Worcester v. Georgia,
Marshall held that Georgia’s effort to assert jurisdiction over the Cherokee
Nation was invalid,70 thus reinforcing that only the federal government and the
federal court system had jurisdiction over claims in which Native populations
were a party. Marshall’s view of the relationship between the federal
government and Native Nations was that tribes were “domestic dependent
nations” because “they are in a state of pupilage . . . their relation to the United
States resembles that of a ward to his guardian.”71
3. The Trust Doctrine and the Indian Reorganization Act
The understanding of the federal government as a guardian of Native Nations
developed into a legal doctrine known as the “trust doctrine”—a policy that
incorporated the concept of the United States federal government as a fiduciary
over Native Nations.72 As a fiduciary, there was a limit on the plenary power of
the federal government when it came to legislation involving Indian tribes.73 In
making decisions about Native Nations, the federal government had a
responsibility: it could not create a new law that involved Native Nations if that
law would have negative impacts upon those nations.74 While this doctrine does
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74

Wood, supra note 23, at 1631–32.
Wood, supra note 23, at 1631–32.
Wood, supra note 23, at 1632–33.
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1822.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1825.
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1825.
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1825.
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not exist formally, its influence is apparent through the way the federal
government interacts with Native Nations.75
The fiduciary nature of the relationship of the federal government to Native
Nations morphed in 1934 with the introduction of the Indian Reorganization Act
(“IRA”).76 This act relinquished the federal government’s fiduciary role over
Native Nations in favor of granting these nations the authority to regulate
themselves and interact with other domestic governments through the federal
court system.77 President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to mend relationships
between the federal government and Native Nations, and under his tenure, the
Indian Reorganization Act was passed.78 The IRA recognized and facilitated the
power of Native Nations to self-govern and reinforced the doctrine of inherent
tribal sovereignty.79
[T]he IRA provided formal federal recognition for each Native Nation
to organize and, by majority vote, form institutions to self-govern. The
Act offered the Native Nations the opportunity to ratify a written
constitution, which the United States would recognize as governing
within each Nation’s territory, and to form a separate corporate charter
in order to foster economic development and manage natural
resources.80

Part of the IRA’s effort to foster economic development in Native Nations
is that it gave tribes the ability to incorporate; they could create corporations
under the name of the tribe for the purpose of conducting business transactions
with nontribal companies.81 Incorporation under the charters of section 17 of the
IRA creates a business that is owned by the tribe but that operates distinct from
the Native Nation with which it is associated.82 Some courts have held these two
organizations, the tribe and the tribal corporation, are legally distinct.83
However, many courts––including the Sixth Circuit––have found that tribal
immunity extends to tribal corporations in certain contexts.84
75
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1802; see OFF. OF NAT. RES. REVENUE, ORIGINS OF THE TRUST DOCTRINE:
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT AND INDIAN TRIBES (2012) (discussing the Trust
Doctrine, the principles that undergird the doctrine, and discussing legal sources––including federal case law––
applying the Trust Doctrine to the relationship between the federal government and Native Nations.).
76
Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
77
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1813.
78
Conkright, supra note 43, at 1182.
79
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1813.
80
Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1813 (citations omitted).
81
Conkright, supra note 43, at 1177.
82
Conkright, supra note 43, at 1183–84.
83
Conkright, supra note 43, at 1184.
84
Conkright, supra note 43, at 1192; see Memphis Biofuels, L.L.C. v. Chickasaw Nation Indus., Inc.,
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The passage of the IRA created a new way to evaluate Congressional
interactions with Native Nations because it demonstrated that Congress desired
to “promote the goal of Indian self-government, including its overriding goal of
encouraging tribal self-sufficiency and economic development.”85 The
legislative history of the IRA supports the concept that it was meant to be a
radical reformation in the way that the federal government interacted with tribal
governments. The House Committee on Indian Affairs described the act as a tool
“to rehabilitate the Indian’s economic life and to give him a chance to develop
the initiative destroyed by a century of oppression and paternalism.”86 This
statement indicates that Congress meant the IRA to be a form of reparative
legislation. The formulation of Native Nation sovereignty as reparation means
that all privileges associated with that sovereignty would also be significant
reparative efforts, chief among them tribal immunity.
The expression of this congressional desire is hailed by many as one of the
greatest achievements between the United States and tribal relations. Maggie
Blackhawk in her article, Federal Indian Law as Paradigm Within Public Law,
argues that “the national government has best protected Native peoples by
bestowing power, not rights, through the recognition of inherent tribal
sovereignty.”87 The IRA is still considered to be the single most important piece
of legislation to affect Native American tribes.88 The ability of Native Nations
to self-govern allowed them to organize and build resources around efforts that
are central to tribal identity, and they “have begun language revitalization
efforts, established highly successful business enterprises, fortified traditional
forms of governance, and have become the ‘laboratories of democracy’ to which
the federalism of the United States aspires.”89
B. Sovereign Immunity as Right of Sovereignty
The IRA allowed tribes to establish their own systems of governance, and
unlike state governments, these systems recognized tribes as “separate
sovereigns, tribal governments [that] are ‘extraconstitutional’ or not bound by
the specific text of the Constitution. However, tribal governments are not
‘extraconstitutional,’ in the sense that the U.S. Constitution has no relevance to

585 F.3d 917, 918 (6th Cir. 2009); GNS, Inc. v. Winnebago Tribe of Neb., 866 F. Supp. 1185, 1188–89 (N.D.
Iowa 1994).
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In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 596 (9th Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted).
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Conkright, supra note 43, at 1182–83 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-1804, at 6 (1934)).
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Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1798.
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Conkright, supra note 43, at 1182.
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them or no effect on them.”90 It is well established that although Native Nations
exist in a space outside the scope of United States federalism, Congress still has
the authority to abrogate tribal immunity. However, absent a congressional act,
tribes maintain existing sovereign powers and “possess those aspects of
sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty, statute, or by implication as a result of their
dependent status.”91 American case law has repeatedly accepted and reinforced
the concept of Indian tribes as “domestic dependent nations” that exercise
“inherent sovereign authority.”92
The first Supreme Court case to involve tribal immunity was Parks v. Ross
in 1850, in which the court held that Mr. Ross, as chief of the Cherokee Nation,
could not be held personally liable for debts that he owed due to the Cherokee
Nation’s status as a sovereign state.93 In its decision, the Court stated that “an
agent who contracts in the name of his principal is not liable to a suit on such
contract; much less a public officer, acting for his government.”94 Although
tribal immunity was not explicitly expressed in this opinion, the Court held that
a tribal leader could not be sued because of his governmental position in a
sovereign state.
In 1919, the Supreme Court expressly articulated the concept of tribal
immunity for the first time in Turner v. United States, in which, the Court held
that due to its status as a sovereign state, the Creek Nation had immunity from
suit for damages to property that the tribe had leased.95 The Court likened the
Creek Nation to the Cherokee since it was also a “distinct political community”
deserving of the rights of sovereignty.96 The governmental structures enacted by
the five tribes gave them legitimacy in the eyes of the federal government, and
guaranteed rights to sovereign privileges including tribal immunity. These early
judicial decisions recognized immunity for officials in Native governmental
positions, thereby recognizing their sovereignty, even as federal policies aimed
at robbing them of their land and autonomy. The doctrine of tribal immunity is
now considered to be settled law.97
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Blackhawk, supra note 1, at 1808.
Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 805 (2014) (quoting United States v. Wheeler, 435
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Even though Native Nations are considered to be dependent nations within
the United States, they retain powers associated with their sovereignty.98 One
such power is the assertion of sovereign immunity, which “is not an affirmative
act of the tribe . . . [but] is, instead, a claim of status arising from sovereignty
itself.”99 Early cases in the United States that formulated the outline of tribal
immunity justified it both because the sovereign status of tribes guaranteed
immunity and because sovereign immunity protects the sovereign government’s
treasury.100 In 1895, the Eighth Circuit upheld the decision of a territorial court
that dismissed a suit against the Choctaw Nation.101 The court justified the ruling
by stating that Congress had never conferred jurisdiction to the court for an
action against a tribal nation, and that absent such a statement, the Choctaw
could not be sued without permission due to their sovereignty and the fact that
permission of such suits filed by individuals would inevitably impoverish it.102
The passage of the IRA further supported the two justifications for a doctrine
of tribal immunity. It recognized the sovereignty of Native Nations by vastly
expanding the legislative power of those Nations to self-govern, and it explicitly
articulated a congressional desire for tribal economic independence. After the
passage of the IRA and the establishment of tribal systems of governance,
“[t]ribal governments deal[t] directly with state and federal governments
through compacts and agreements and [were able to] represent the collective
needs of their citizens both in courts and before the Congress and the
executive.”103 As unique sovereigns that were able to represent themselves in
legal proceedings, interact with other domestic governments, and write their
own Constitutions, there was strong evidence that Native Nations should be
granted the same privileges that are granted to other sovereigns within United
States jurisprudence.104
The sovereign immunity of Native tribes has continued to be upheld by
Congress despite multiple opportunities to repeal or weaken it.105 In 1998, the
Supreme Court had the opportunity to review the doctrine of tribal immunity in
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In re Greene, 980 F.2d 590, 600 (9th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 595.
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Wood, supra note 23, at 1590.
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Seielstad, supra note 25, at 689.
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Seielstad, supra note 25, at 690–91.
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Kiowa Tribes, and after conversation about why the doctrine of tribal immunity
should be doubted, and perhaps repealed, the Court ultimately deferred to
Congress and upheld the tribe’s sovereign immunity privilege.106 At the time
that Kiowa Tribes was before the Court, Congress was reviewing possible
changes to the tribal immunity doctrine.107 Despite the Court’s criticisms in
Kiowa Tribes, Congress denied the opportunity to operationally change tribal
sovereign immunity, and the bill on the subject enacted in 2000 had no real
substantive impact on the doctrine.108 There is clear congressional intent to
maintain tribal sovereign immunity. This also favors a pro-tribal immunity
interpretation of section 106(a) of the Code.
Native Nations’ sovereign status grants them the privilege of tribal
immunity. “Immunity from suit has been recognized by the courts of this country
as integral to the sovereignty and self-governance of Indian tribes.”109 Due to
the sui generis relationship between Native peoples and the federal government
of the United States, the shape of that immunity is unique.110
One of the unique aspects of tribal immunity is the influence of federal
Indian law. Federal Indian law has influenced the formation of tribal immunity
because the trust doctrine still remains active in aspects within tribal immunity.
The trust doctrine guaranteed that while acting on behalf of Native Nations, the
federal government maintained a fiduciary role and always made decisions in
the best interests of those nations.111 The dependent relationship formed by the
trust doctrine ensured that tribal powers, such as sovereign immunity, were only
divested by the tribe’s dependent status in cases where “the exercise of tribal
sovereignty would be inconsistent with the overriding interests of the National
Government . . . .”112 The federal government may not abrogate tribal immunity
unless allowing tribes to retain their immunity is against the best interests of the
federal government because, absent such federal interests, an abrogation of tribal
immunity would not be in the best interests of Native Nations.113
In addition, the trust doctrine, in tandem with the goals of encouraging tribal
self-sufficiency and economic development set forward by the IRA, created a
106
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canon in federal Indian law that required that all ambiguity in statutes be
resolved in favor of Native Nations.114 This “doctrine rests on a core
principle . . . of federal Indian law: that the national government is obligated to
support Native Nations and Native sovereignty in order to mitigate its status as
colonizer and to preserve its status as a constitutional democracy.”115
The trust doctrine binds the executive and legislative branches to make and
enforce laws that do not damage native populations, but the judicial branch is
noticeably absent from much of modern federal Indian law. The Marshall trilogy
granted the executive branch the power to take Native lands, which was later
used to justify the kidnapping of native children and forced assimilation of native
populations.116 The courts refused to hear many of the cases that stemmed from
these human rights violations, and instead allowed federal Indian law to be run
by the executive and legislative branches.117 In 1871, Congress announced a
change in policy in which federal Indian relations would become a legislative
regime as opposed to one run by diplomacy.118
The Supreme Court held that Congress had the plenary power to determine
the boundaries of tribal relationships with states and the federal government,
effectively green-lighting a regime in which federal policy surrounding Native
Nations was determined unilaterally by the legislative branch.119 For this reason,
much of federal Indian Law exists outside of the courts.120 The judicial system’s
tradition of extraditing themselves from issues between the federal government
and Native Nations continues today. In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian
Community, the Court stated that “a fundamental commitment of Indian law is
judicial respect for Congress’s primary role in defining the contours of tribal
sovereignty.”121 The Court consistently defers to Congress about whether tribal
immunity is abrogated in any given situation and to abrogate a tribe’s sovereign
immunity, “Congress must ‘unequivocally’ express that purpose”122 because
“Congress has consistently reiterated its approval of the immunity doctrine.”123
Due to Congress’s consistent support of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and
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the judiciary’s lack of presence in the realm of federal Indian law, courts often
assume that Congress is aware of the way that the Court has interpreted tribal
immunity and that an absence of an intention to alter tribal immunity is
equivalent to an endorsement of its continued power.124
II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
This Section will explore the application of tribal immunity to bankruptcy
law by explaining and rejecting the analysis of the court in Krystal Energy
Company. This Section will then distinguish tribal immunity from state
sovereign immunity and foreign sovereign immunity in order to establish that a
statute may exist that abrogates state and foreign sovereign immunity and leaves
tribal immunity intact.
A. Application to Bankruptcy Law
The abrogation of certain sovereign immunities in section 106 of the Code
was a major change in the common law around those forms of sovereign
immunity. This change was justified by the power of the Code and the law
surrounding it. It was argued that the Bankruptcy Clause provided this level of
power because of its history in the Constitution; the Bankruptcy Clause was
incorporated into the Constitution with little debate.125 The grant of bankruptcy
power to the federal government was agreed upon at the Constitutional
Convention and was seen as necessary in order to ensure an economically
functioning nation.126 Prior to the Bankruptcy Clause’s introduction, injustices
were prevalent because states were failing to honor one another’s bankruptcy
discharge orders.127 A state would discharge a debtor’s obligations, only for that
debtor to be arrested and imprisoned in a different state.128 This failure to grant
full faith to the litigatory proceedings between states threatened the unity of the
federal government. The Bankruptcy Clause was introduced to make this issue
a federal one and ensure economic stability.129 The states signed onto the
Constitution knowing that the power to enact bankruptcy legislation carried with
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it the power to subordinate state sovereignty around that bankruptcy
legislation.130
In the 1930s, the Court continued to reaffirm the expansive scope of the
bankruptcy power, and only struck down bankruptcy legislation in cases where
the bankruptcy power had to yield to other constitutional demands.131 While the
Eleventh Amendment may seem like precisely the kind of constitutional demand
that the bankruptcy power would yield to, this is not the case.132 Sovereign
immunity protects a government from in personam liability; it is a protection of
a governmental structure’s integrity, not of a governmental structure’s
property.133 Bankruptcy is a proceeding in rem; people file for bankruptcy in
order to have the in personam liability of debtors dismissed, and the debt levied
only against property that they may own.134 For this reason, bankruptcy
proceedings may be filed against a governmental structure without destroying
its sovereign immunity.135
Allowing a federal government to establish personal jurisdiction over a state
would be considered an indignity to the sovereignty of that state.136 However,
sovereign immunity does not bar federal jurisdiction over in rem proceedings in
which the state is involved.137 Proceedings in bankruptcy may abrogate state
sovereign immunity because a bankruptcy court’s jurisdiction is completely in
rem; it only deals with the estate.138 The Court may adjudicate discharge claims
and others without asserting personal jurisdiction over a state.139
Adversary proceedings are treated similarly; they are considered to be part
of the original bankruptcy case and are therefore still within the in rem
jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy court.140 Outside of adversary proceedings,
any proceeding that is a result of the filing of the petition is “merely ancillary to
the Bankruptcy Court’s exercise of its in rem jurisdiction . . . [and does not]
implicate state sovereign immunity.”141
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Due to the in rem nature of bankruptcy proceedings, the federal government
was able to abrogate the sovereign immunity of various governmental structures
through the addition to section 106 to the Code. This section states that
“notwithstanding assertion of sovereign immunity, sovereign immunity is
abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section . . . .”142
There is no doubt that this section of the Code abrogates sovereign immunity
for states, commonwealths and foreign states, as these governmental structures
are explicitly enumerated within the definition of “governmental unit.”
However, Native Nations are not enumerated, and a circuit split exists as to
whether the language of section 106 abrogates sovereign immunity for Tribal
governments within bankruptcy proceedings.143
The argument put forward by Krystal Energy Company is that the term
“other foreign or domestic government” includes Native Nations.144 The Ninth
Circuit stated that Tribes are governmental structures and are within the United
States, thereby making them domestic governments whose immunity Congress
intended to abrogate as an “other foreign or domestic government.”145 To
support this claim, the court compared section 106(a) of the Code to the Age
Discrimination Act.146 The court discusses Kimel, in which the Supreme Court
stated that Congress listed “states” as a “public agency” whose sovereign
immunity was abrogated within the context of suits for employee backpay after
unjust termination.147 The Supreme Court held the law did not require each
individual state to be listed because each such state is subsumed under the
umbrella term of “states.”148 The abrogation did not need to explicitly name an
individual state for its immunity to be curtailed, it only needed to demonstrate
that the legislature explicitly intended for that immunity to be abrogated.149 The
Ninth Circuit analogizes that tribes are referenced as domestic dependent nations
within legal precedent and so the phrase “all foreign and domestic governments”
includes Tribal government because it is a catch all for all governmental
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structures.150 Therefore, there is explicit Congressional intent that tribal
immunity be abrogated within the context of section 106.151
The logic expressed by the Krystal Energy Company court is flawed in
multiple regards. Firstly, the argument that Native Nations are subsumed under
the umbrella of “domestic governments” in the same way that the Court in Kimel
mentions “states” would include Alabama, Alaska, or other states is false logic.
The term “states” inherently includes all of the fifty states because statehood is
fundamental to each individual state’s identity. Alabama is a land mass defined
by its borders and local governments, but it is equally self-defined by its
statehood and its relationship to the federal government. Alabama is equally
defined by its position on a map as it is by its Congressional representation in
the Senate and the House of Representatives; its statehood is inexorably tied to
its governmental identity. The same is not true of Native Nations and the term
“domestic governments.” Native Nations are not bound by the specific text of
the Constitution, even though they are affected by it and by the legislation of the
federal government.152 Black’s Law Dictionary defines “domestic” as “[o]f,
relating to, or involving one’s own country,” or “[o]f, relating to, or involving
one’s own jurisdiction.”153 Native Nations are domestic to the United States
federal government in that they are physically within the nation and they are
subject to federal jurisdiction. However, Native Nations do not participate in the
federal governmental structure and they are not bound entirely by the
Constitution in the same way that state governments and traditional domestic
governments are tied to the Constitution.154 Native Nations do not self-define as
domestic governments underneath the United States federal government in the
same way that a state like Alabama would self-define by its statehood.155 The
analogy used by the Krystal Energy Company court is weak and tenuous.
Secondly, the court in Krystal Energy Company was incorrect to find that
Congress intended to abrogate tribal immunity within the text of section 106. It
is well established that to abrogate tribal immunity, either congressional
legislation must demonstrate intent to abrogate tribal immunity through an
explicit, unequivocal expression of congressional intent, or a tribe must waive
the right to maintain tribal immunity.156 The court in Krystal Energy Company
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claimed that section 106 demonstrated a clear congressional intent to abrogate
tribal immunity, however the history of tribal immunity as explored earlier in
this Comment, as well as case law, demonstrate the opposite.157
There is no Congressional intent to abrogate tribal immunity in section 106.
The court in Krystal Energy Company states that Native Nations are included in
the definition of governmental structures as defined by section 101(27), but
the Supreme Court has referred to Indian tribes as ‘sovereigns,’
‘nations,’ and even ‘distinct, independent political communities,
retaining their original natural rights,’ [and] the trustees cite no case in
which the Supreme Court has referred to an Indian tribe as a
‘government’ of any sort . . . If the Supreme Court considered an
Indian tribe to be a ‘government,’ it would not go to such great lengths
to avoid saying so.158

Arguendo, even if a Native Nation is considered to be a “governmental unit,”
the argument still flounders because the question at issue in terms of the
abrogation of tribal immunity is not whether Tribal governments are
governmental structures that fit into the umbrella of “governmental units” as
defined under the Code, but rather whether Congress explicitly and
unequivocally intended to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity when it wrote that
definition.159 It did not.
“Explicit, unequivocal expression of congressional intent”160 implies that
there can be no doubt as to the intention of Congress in drafting the legislation.161
In the matter of the abrogation of tribal immunity by section 106, courts have
come out on both sides of the issue, demonstrating that there is nothing
“unequivocal” about the potential abrogation.162 Additionally, there is precedent
that a piece of legislation does not abrogate tribal immunity unless it explicitly
mentions Native Nations in text of the law.163 In In re Whitaker, the court stated
that “where the language of a federal statute does not include “Indian tribes” in
definitions of parties subject to suit or does not specifically assert jurisdiction
over “Indian tribes,” courts find the statute insufficient to express an unequivocal
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congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.”164 Therefore, a statute
such as section 106 that abrogates sovereign immunity for “domestic units”
should not be interpreted to abrogate sovereign immunity for Tribal
governments.165 Congress did not specifically name Tribal governments within
section 101(27), despite naming every other sovereign specifically.
Accordingly, the sensible inference is that Congress intended to exclude tribes
from this definition as exemplified in the Constitutional interpretive canon that
the specific inclusion of one thing or series of things, implicitly implies the
exclusion of another.166 For these reasons, there is no congressional
demonstration of an intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Native Nations
in the text of section 106.
Further, there is no waiver of tribal immunity implicit in section 106.
Sovereign immunity may be waived through certain actions around a claim, such
as filing a counterclaim or selecting a certain forum.167 In the same way, certain
arguments assert that filing for bankruptcy ought to waive sovereign immunity
for the person or governmental unit who filed the bankruptcy petition.168
However, the sovereign immunity of Native Nations is different than the
sovereign immunity given to other governmental units. The application of these
rules to tribal immunity is different from the sovereign immunities of other
governmental units.
Just as the abrogation of Native Nation sovereign immunity by Congress
must be explicit and unequivocal, tribal waiver of immunity must also be
express; Native Nations may not waive their sovereign immunity by
implication.169 A tribal waiver of sovereign immunity “must be clear and
unequivocal.”170 This is different than a waiver of tribal immunity from a state.
A state can implicitly waive its sovereign immunity through certain actions
around a claim such as removal of cases that have been filed against them.171
Tribes that do the same do not waive their tribal immunity.172 Similarly, states
that file a bankruptcy petition waive state sovereign immunity as to the adversary
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proceedings later filed as a result of that bankruptcy petition, but the same is not
necessarily true of other sovereigns such as Native Nations.173 The only
established implicit waiver of tribal immunity occurs when Native Nations, or
corporations formed underneath those nations, sign contracts that include
arbitration clauses.174
This distinction between arbitration clauses in settled contracts and actions
around litigation makes good sense. Removal and filing of counterclaims are
affirmative actions, yet they do not inherently require Native Nations to confront
the possibility of suit against them, and thus they do not fulfill the requirement
of clear waiver of immunity within that affirmative action.175 Comparatively,
arbitration clauses in contracts do require confrontation with the possibility of
future suits, and thus the affirmative action of signing the contract with full
knowledge of the clauses therein constitutes a clear and unequivocal waiver of
tribal immunity.176 Filing for bankruptcy is more similar to a removal or a
counterclaim than it is to the signing of a contract; it is an affirmative action, but
it does not mandate that the person or governmental unit that files the petition
confronts the possibility of future suit within the text of the petition.
It may be argued that section 106 is comparable to an arbitration clause in
that it states that sovereign immunity will be abrogated and thus gives Native
Nations fair warning and forces them to confront the possibility of future suit.
But this argument is weak because, as discussed, there is nothing unequivocal
about section 106’s abrogation of tribal immunity.177 The circuit split on this
issue demonstrates that the abrogation is not “unequivocal.”178 Native Nations
filing for bankruptcy do not implicitly waive their privilege of sovereign
immunity.
The language of section 106 does not demonstrate express congressional
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and filing a bankruptcy petition
does not qualify as a waiver of a Native Nation’s sovereign immunity. As such,
Native Nation sovereign immunity should be maintained within the context of
the Code. From a layman’s perspective, it may seem that stripping the privilege
of sovereign immunity from some governmental structures and maintaining it
for others is fundamentally unfair. However, treating sovereign immunities for
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different governmental structures with an uneven hand actually supports
concepts of fairness because of the practical differences in sovereign immunity
as applied through the lens of American jurisprudence to various governmental
structures. An examination of the differences of tribal immunity compared to
state and foreign sovereign immunity will further illuminate this fact.
B. Tribal Immunity vs. State and Foreign Sovereign Immunity
There are significant differences between the United States jurisprudential
view of tribal immunity compared to the sovereign immunity offered to state
and foreign governments. This Section will highlight these differences to
demonstrate that a statute can abrogate sovereign immunity for certain
governmental entities while securing sovereign immunity for Native Nations.
The difference between tribal immunity and state sovereign immunity
begins at the creation of the United States nation. The need for explicit language
when it comes to tribal immunity exists because states willingly surrendered
immunity from suits brought by other states when they signed on to a federal
Constitution.179 Tribes never ceded this privilege because they never agreed to
be governed by the federal government; they were forced into this relationship
through violence. Thus, the immunity is highly guarded and requires an express
statement of congressional intention to abrogate it.180 The abrogation of
sovereign immunity for foreign nations may also be implied absent explicit
language because these nations are were not violently forced into being
governed by the federal government.
While courts have stated that nothing short of express congressional
intention will abrogate tribal immunity, the same is not true for the sovereign
immunity of states nor that of foreign nations. Part of the rationale behind the
very strict requirement of an unequivocal expression of congressional intent is
the fact that Native Nations never agreed to exist under the rule of the federal
government.181 Requirements for the abrogation of state sovereign immunity are
not as strictly read; the judiciary will make presumptions of congressional
intention to abrogate state sovereign immunity, and do not require an explicit
statement of abrogation.
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Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 789–90 (2014).
See id.
See id.
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The Supreme Court has held that if a state moves to remove a case to federal
court, that state has effectively waived its sovereign immunity.182 Similarly,
section 1605(a)(1) of title 28 states that the sovereign immunity of foreign
nations may be abrogated by explicit or implied withdrawal of such a
privilege.183 A foreign nation may abrogate its sovereign immunity by either
agreeing to a clause to arbitrate in the United States, or by agreeing to arbitrate
in a nation that signed the New York Arbitration Convention.184 In Tatneft,
Ukraine signed a contract in which both parties agreed to arbitrate any
disagreements in France as part of Tatneft’s contract for stock in the oil company
Ukrtatnafta.185 The court ruled that because the parties agreed to arbitrate in
France, and because France signed the New York Arbitration Convention,
thereby allowing arbitrations in France to find forum in the United States, the
Ukraine should have foreseen a forum in the United States, and had waived its
sovereign immunity by implication.186
In comparison to the state waiver of the sovereign immunity by motion for
removal, a tribe that moves for removal does not waive its immunity through
implication in the same way; rather the waiver must be explicit.187 States may
also waive their right to sovereign immunity by filing a counterclaim against a
claimant, while Native Nations do not waive sovereign immunity from actions
that could not otherwise be brought against it simply by filing a counterclaim.188
In comparison to the foreign nation waiver of sovereign immunity by arbitration
clause, the case law as to the effect of an arbitration clause on a Native Nation
is mixed. In C & L Enterprises, the Supreme Court held that a consent to
arbitration clause was an explicit waiver of tribal immunity.189
However, four years later in Big Valley Band of Pomo Indians., the Court of
Appeals of California held that an arbitration clause in a contract between an
Indian tribe and its employees did not waive tribal immunity because although
it did specify forums of jurisdiction, it did not explicitly consent to arbitration.190
This was distinguished from C & L Enterprises because the arbitration clause
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In re Greektown Holdings, 917 F.3d at 465–66.
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only required the arbitration of suits and the enforcement of arbitration awards;
it did not include a consent to arbitration.191 Therefore, while all forum specific
arbitration clauses will act as waivers of sovereign immunity for foreign nations,
at least in certain jurisdictions, only arbitration clauses that consent to
arbitration––explicitly and voluntarily abrogating sovereign immunity––will
operate as waivers to tribal immunity.192 This is one way that the sovereign
immunity afforded to Native Nations has a different shape than sovereign
immunity granted to state governments and foreign national governments.
The sovereign immunities of foreign nations and of Native Nations are
similar in that both may be abrogated by a congressional act, however the
immunity of Native Nations is inherently different because Native Nations are
domestic to the United States.193 The subject of tribal immunity is much more
pertinent than that of sovereign immunity of foreign nations because Native
Nations may only interact economically within the United States; they are
forbidden from engaging in trade relationships with foreign nations.194 If a
foreign nation would like to avoid a congressional statute abrogating its
sovereign immunity, it has the option of engaging in trade with other nations.
Native Nations do not have this ability.195 They may only trade with other
governments that exist inside of the physical borders of the United States, and
so they are unable to avoid congressional statutes that abrogate their tribal
immunity. The congressional abrogation of tribal immunity affects the economic
welfare of Native Nations far more than congressional abrogation of sovereign
immunity affects the economic welfare of foreign nations. For these reasons,
Congress treats the sovereign immunities of foreign nations and Native Nations
differently. This is why it makes sense that a statute could abrogate sovereign
immunity for a foreign nation without abrogating sovereign immunity for Native
Nations.
Tribes exist without distinction for where tribal activities occurred.196 A tribe
may claim immunity for activities that occurred both inside and outside of tribal
lands.197 In Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., the state of Michigan attempted
to sue an Indian tribe that purchased land outside of the tribe’s reservation and
attempted to build a casino upon it because it violated the Indian Gaming
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Id.
See id.
See Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014).
U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
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Kiowa Tribe v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).
Id.

SANTANGELO_4.19.21

352

4/19/2021 10:33 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

Regulatory Act of 1988.198 The Supreme Court held that Michigan could not sue
the tribe because its sovereign immunity was not abrogated simply because the
casino existed outside of reservation property.199 The Court held that this result
was correct because comity would not exist in the relationship between states
and tribes if states were allowed to sue tribes for commerce activity on state
lands but Tribes were not permitted to sue states for commerce activity on Tribal
lands.200
Tribal immunity is more difficult to abrogate, but that does not mean that it
is inherently “stronger” than the immunity afforded to states. Congress’s plenary
power allows it to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity wherever it sees fit
because it is a common law doctrine.201 In comparison, because state sovereign
immunity is maintained by the Eleventh Amendment, it may not be abrogated
in lawsuits brought by individuals outside of Fourteenth Amendment
contexts.202 Although tribal immunity must be abrogated through an explicit
statement of congressional intent, it may be abrogated within any context.
Comparatively, state sovereign immunity may be abrogated through
implication, but it can only be done in select contexts.
Additionally, state governments may abrogate one another’s sovereign
immunity in ways that Native Nations cannot.203 States surrender immunity
against particular litigants in two cases: suits by sister states and suits by the
United States.204 One way that states may abrogate another state’s sovereign
immunity is that a state may open its courts to a private citizen’s lawsuit against
another state without the other state’s consent.205 In such a case, the Constitution
only permits the state adjudicating the case to award damages against the state
that is involved in the litigation that are equal to what it would award if its own
government were involved in that same litigation.206 To allow an adjudicatory
state to award anything more would evince a “policy of hostility.”207 By
allowing states to only make judgments against other states that it would allow
against itself, the court ensures that comity continues to exist between states.
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Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. at 813.
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Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 59 (1996).
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For example, in Franchise Tax Board v. Hyatt, the plaintiff sought to sue the
state of California in the courts of Nevada for abusive audit and investigation
practices.208 California courts did not allow such suits against the state by private
citizens and barred such litigation, but Nevada courts would allow such a suit to
be litigated against the Nevada government.209 Thus, Nevada was allowed
jurisdiction over California so long as the damages awarded were no greater than
those that would be awarded if Hyatt were suing the Nevada government for the
same charge.210 While states enjoy this degree of adjudicatory power over one
another, Native Nations do not have this same power. A Native Nation may not
abrogate a state’s sovereign immunity, even if in doing so, the Native Nation is
acting in full comity and treating that state the way that the Nation would treat
its own government in an identical situation.
States may abrogate one another’s sovereign immunity, but Native Nations,
in spite of their recognition as domestic entities, do not have this same privilege.
Tribes have argued that while the federal government maintained a paternalistic
fiduciary or trustee relationship with tribes, it had the ability to sue states on
behalf of those tribes, thereby abrogating the state’s sovereign immunity by
filing the claim. Therefore, when the federal government took a step away from
that paternalistic role, section 1362 of title 28 delegated the authority of the
federal government to sue on a tribe’s behalf back to the tribe.211 Accordingly,
a lawsuit put forward against a state by a Native Nation should abrogate that
state’s sovereign immunity.212 However, in Blatchford, the Supreme Court
dismissed this argument.213 It held that sovereign exemption cannot be delegated
in such a way, and did not allow the Native village to sue the state of Alaska
because Alaska could assert a defense of sovereign immunity.214 The Noatak
Nation had no way to pursue damages incurred as a result of Alaska’s breach of
contract.
States also have a level of non-reciprocal authority over Native Nations that
fall within the borders of any given state. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of
1988 grants states a power over tribes that they would not otherwise have; a
208
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See id.
210
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wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.”);
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 783 (1991).
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measure of authority over gaming that takes place on Indian lands.215 Under this
statute, a state has the right to regulate gambling occurring on Native land and
has exclusive authority to approve the grant of gambling licenses to new
institutions within state borders, even if it falls within the physical limits of a
Native Nation.216
While the Act granted states the power to control gambling on Native lands,
it also required states to take on responsibilities around that gambling, including
requiring state efforts to expediate the grant licenses and to be proactive in
regulatory duties.217 Cases soon arose where state governments failed to uphold
their responsibilities and follow the guidelines that the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act had laid out, but when Native Nations filed injunctive litigation
to pressure state governments to follow through on these responsibilities, the
suits were dismissed under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity.218 Courts
consistently decided that even though tribal power was abrogated and Native
Nations depended on state governments to run major sources of income for tribal
communities within Native territories, litigation to hold states to their
commitments was prevented from moving forward.219 The tribe had to follow
the regulatory laws around gambling that were laid out by the state, but could
not sue the state when it failed to meet its responsibilities around those same
laws.220
A state’s power to encroach upon the sovereignty of Native Nations does not
stop with the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act of 1988 because of the large degree
of power that states hold over Native Nations comes from taxation law. Native
governments do have certain powers of taxation. They may tax their own
citizens on sales of products to other Native citizens within Native lands.221 This
is a very narrow sliver of economic exchanges that are available for taxation. In
comparison, the state has the authority to collect taxes on sales within tribal lands
to non-Native populations, to collect taxes on sales between citizens of Native
Nations that occur outside of tribal lands, and to collect income taxes on Native
citizens who live outside of tribal lands.222
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Taxation is a major economic factor for any governmental structure and
allows governments to create revenue necessary to function and provide services
to its citizens. Allowing states to collect the vast majority of taxes that revolve
around the exchange of goods on Native lands effectively prevents Native
Nations from taxing sales within their own lands, because this double taxation
would stymie economic growth.223 Native Nations could try to tax these
exchanges twice but that would encourage buyers and sellers to move exchanges
outside of Native lands and would further harm Native economies. Additionally,
the risk of having to pay double taxes on certain goods would discourage
companies from creating new businesses on Native lands.224 States therefore
hold massive economic powers over Native Nations that fall within their
borders, without any sense of comity. Native Nations can exert no such power
over the state in which it is located.
This power dynamic between states and Native Nations is relevant in an
analysis of sovereign immunity because the doctrine of sovereign immunity is
derived from the sovereignty of a governmental structure.225 Therefore, the way
that the sovereign immunities of two distinct governmental bodies interact
expresses something about their right to sovereignty. The litigatory interactions
between states and Native Nations and the differences of the sovereign immunity
afforded to a state versus the sovereign immunity afforded to a Native
government clearly demonstrates that a state’s sovereign identity and a Native
Nation’s sovereign identity are distinct from one another.
The sovereign immunity of Native Nations, both theoretically and
practically, is separate and apart from the sovereign immunity of state
governments within the United States. This distinction is necessary when it
comes to discussions of fairness in the law. Because there is no real “fairness”
in the comparison of state and tribal sovereign immunity, it makes good sense
that a congressional act could abrogate sovereign immunity for a state while
maintaining sovereign immunity for Native Nations. In fact, because the
precedential jurisprudence allows states to impede upon tribal immunity in ways
that are not reciprocal, concepts of fairness should be encouraged by making
tribal immunity more difficult to abrogate than state sovereign immunity.
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III. THE FUTURE: REPARATIONS, REPERCUSSIONS AND THE EXPRESSIVE
POWER OF THE LAW
Fairness in the law is such a dynamic concept because many sociologists
believe that people’s trust in the law, and the fact that the people are willing to
bend to the will of the law and recognize it as a legitimate construct, is partially
based on the concept that the law is just.226 Concepts of fairness are so inherent
to United States concepts of justice that the Fourteenth Amendment includes the
Due Process clause to ensure both procedural and structural fundamental
fairness in the application of the law to United States citizens.227 Fairness is
quintessential to our understanding of justice. However, this concept of fairness
is not fully fleshed out in many of the court opinions around tribal immunity and
its application to section 106 of the Code because, though they consider the law
around tribal immunity, they fail to consider the history. In failing to consider
the history, courts fail to consider the fairness of a carve out for Native Nations
as an equalizer to encourage the economic development of Native communities.
The final Section of this paper will explore this brand of fairness. It will
consider tribal immunity as a continuation of the reparation begun by the Indian
Reorganization Act, and it will discuss the importance of these conversations to
the expressive power of the law and how this affects the future of tribal immunity
in the context of 106 of the Code.
A. Tribal Immunity as Reparation
Reparations movements in the United States are defined by the Black
reparation movement. These movements have existed for as long as civil
rights.228 However, reparations as a concept has had waves of popularity, with
the fourth wave occurring rather recently.229 This new wave is considerably
different than past iterations of the argument. Former concepts of reparations
were based upon economic funding for individuals. Built upon a civil rights
conceptualization of racial politics, they focused on access to the courts as the
harbinger of justice, and reparations were sought in the form of claims filed
against the families of former white landowners.230 Black Americans filed
226
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claims that relied mostly on tort and quantum meruit contract law to seek
economic justice for the labor of their ancestors and for the emotional damages
caused by the legacy of slavery.231 The issue with the conceptualization of
reparations as a demand for compensation from a realpolitik perspective was
that it was easy to attack from multiple perspectives.232 Defense lawyers attacked
it on legal grounds, challenging statutes of limitations and standing while
conservative scholars attacked it from an academic perspective, questioning
whether wealthy Black citizens ought to receive financial compensation.233 In
addition to academic attacks, there was a general skepticism from the white
public who felt that they should not be forced to pay for the sins of their
ancestors.234 Additionally, this form of reparations failed to consider the
emotional toll that slavery had on Black communities. While it asked for
emotional damages, it did nothing to remedy by way of therapeutic catharsis, the
emotional toll of centuries of violence.235
In 2006, the Seventh Circuit ended federal access to the individual-claim
form of reparations in In re African American Slave Descendants Litigation.236
Judge Posner affirmed the lower court’s holding that the plaintiffs had no
standing to pursue their tort and unjust enrichment claims because “[i]t would
be impossible by the methods of litigation to connect the defendants’ alleged
misconduct with the financial and emotional harm that the plaintiffs claim to
have suffered as a result of that conduct” and because the “causal chain is too
long and has too many weak links for a court to be able to find that the
defendants’ conduct harmed the plaintiffs at all.”237
Following this loss, reparations started to move in a new direction that
focused on three major aspects of repair: “recognizing and accepting
responsibility for historic injustice; repairing present-day damage traceable to
past injustice; and building productive group relationships.”238 These new wave
conceptualizations of reparations focus on history as a healing point; it does not
ignore or excuse the past, but nor does it seek vengeance.239 Rather, it focuses
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on restoring political and economic power to disenfranchised communities to
allow them to discuss their pain and move away from it through community
bonding.240 Economic healing has always been the basis for Black reparation;
from the earliest days of reparation theory, the movement was seen as a way to
financially heal Black citizens that had been economically disenfranchised by
slavery, and to use this currency for broader Black empowerment within the
United States social sphere.241 However, the focus on community building as an
address to the emotional effects of slavery is a relatively new advent.242
This focus on community building is supported by successful reparations
movements around the world. Perhaps one of the most successful reparations
movement, the reparations of the politically oppressed class during Pinochetrule in Chile, followed such a structure.243 The government addressed victims of
the dictatorial regime directly with “pensions, social services, educational
benefits, public recognition, monuments, sites of memory, and health
assistance” and encouraged open public discussion of the injustices as a way for
citizens to become more involved with the democratic process.244 These public
funded economic resources for disenfranchised communities encouraged
community growth and healing. A similar community bonding aspect was a part
of the reparation efforts in both post-Apartheid South Africa and Rwanda.245
Like all of these movements, Native Nations are also deserving of
reparations due to the history of oppression and systematic violence that the
United States government has committed against them, from the breaking of
peace treaties during manifest destiny to the robbing and assimilation of Native
children.246 The Black reparations movement in the United States and successful
reparations movements internationally are relevant because they inform what a
reparations movement for Native peoples should look like. Through this lens,
we can understand that a history of reparations already exists for Native peoples.
Reparation efforts for Native people are arguably more successful than have
been reparations efforts for Black Americans. The Indian Reorganization Act
recognized and facilitated the power of Native Nations to self-govern and
reinforced the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty.247 It granted Native
240
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Nations a limited power of self-determination. In doing so, it intended to confer
to Native Nations the ability to grow economically in order to build community;
deal with the emotional repercussions of occupation, genocide, and assimilation;
and thrive independently from the federal government.248
Congress also passed the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 to “promote the
stability and security of Indian Tribes and families.”249 This Act was designed
against the backdrop of the United States government taking Native children,
putting them into orphanages and assimilation camps and pushing through hasty
adoptions.250 The Act made it much more difficult for termination of parental
rights in Native populations and gave Native communities preference in cases
of adoption.251
Both of these Congressional Acts confronted the three major goals of the
modern Black reparation movement: “recognizing and accepting responsibility
for historic injustice; repairing present-day damage traceable to past
injustice; and building productive group relationships.”252 The Indian
Reorganization Act recognized and accepted responsibility for the occupation
and exploitation of Native people and the Indian Child Welfare Act recognized
and accepted responsibility for a history of stealing Native children away from
their families in an effort to destroy Native culture.253 The Indian Reorganization
Act tries to repair past injustice by promoting economic growth and political
self-determination in Native Nations, and the Indian Child Welfare Act tries to
repair injustice by ensuring that Native Nations can keep their children and
continue developing their culture.254 Both Acts build productive group
relationships by allowing Native communities to grow, become more selfsufficient, and build separate from the intervention of the federal government.
In this way, these Congressional Acts constructed around Native populations
have been the most effective form of reparations in the history of the United
States.
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The history of the sovereignty of Native Nations as an instrument of
reparations to Native people demonstrates that the benefits of that sovereignty,
chiefly that of sovereign immunity, ought to be considered carefully, and should
be consciously preserved. The Supreme Court understood this when it stated that
the abrogation of tribal immunity required express congressional intent to do so,
thereby differentiating it from other forms of sovereign immunity recognized by
the federal court system.255 However, in these opinions, the court failed to
comprehensively explain the historical lens that grants tribal immunity such
credence. This history must be understood and reflected upon to appreciate the
importance of tribal immunity to Native Nations, and within the context of our
society. Not only does the preservation of this doctrine promote economic
growth within tribal lands, but it also makes a statement about the importance of
atoning for the trauma imposed upon Native populations.
In reparations, “the stakes are high and include both healing for those still
hurting and progress for America’s communities marked by misunderstanding,
mistrust, and division [as well as] the healing of the nation itself.”256 In a period
in United States history that is punctuated by distrust and division, the healing
process of reparations is more relevant than ever. Additionally, reparations push
the United States to confront a past of human rights violations that it has never
fully come to terms with.257 Given the United States’ position as the “center of
democracy” it needs to confront its past to be an example of what a democratic
political system can offer a society.258 United States acknowledgement of its
human rights violations domestically could begin to transform this image and
could perhaps echo internationally.259 Society’s trust in a system of law itself is
at stake in the dialogue about reparations and economic justice.260
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The continuance of a strong tribal immunity doctrine is important because it
is a perpetuation of the reparation efforts that have been legislatively enacted on
behalf of Native Nations. Weakening the doctrine of tribal immunity by
abrogating it in the context of section 106 of the Code is dangerous because it
impedes reparations efforts and makes a strong statement about the United
States’ concepts of justice for groups that the federal government has oppressed
in the past.
B. The Expressive Power of the Law
The power of law is not only that it is informed by the society in which it
exists, but also that, conversely, it can influence society by communicating
information that “can change beliefs and thereby change behavior.”261 Apart
from simple sanctions, the law has power to influence the behavior of
individuals.262 Therefore, the law surrounding the tribal immunity makes a direct
statement as to the way that the federal government considers Native Nations.
The Indian Reorganization Act and the Indian Child Welfare Act, among
others, recognized the sovereignty of Native Nations by granting them the power
to create Constitutions, incorporate businesses and reclaim tribal citizens.263
These laws returned to a recognition of Native peoples as autonomous and apart
from the federal government of the United States, an understanding that existed
from the very beginning of colonial settlement in North America.264 The
recognition of the sovereignty of Native governments strengthened the doctrine
of tribal immunity because sovereign immunity is borne out of any given
government’s sovereign status.265 The law’s consideration and continued respect
for the doctrine of tribal immunity expresses regard for Native Nations as
sovereign governments, but also makes a statement about a renewed atonement
for the prior treatment of these nations. As the federal relationship with Native
Nations changed, and governmental autonomy was handed back to Native
peoples as a form of economic reparation, the importance of tribal immunity
increased. Autonomy for Native Nations was a renewed commitment to
recognizing the sovereignty of those Nations, and so the privileges of that
sovereignty became part of a legislative reparation framework.
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Native Nations were robbed of their sovereignty and forced into a
paternalistic association with the federal government. The renewal of Native
government’s sovereign status and high regard for tribal immunity is a statement
about an effort on the part of the federal government to repair its relationship
with Native peoples. Damaging or weakening this doctrine would be a statement
that reparations to Native populations have been completed. The statistics on
poverty, alcoholism and drug abuse on tribal lands demonstrates that such a
statement would be ill-advised. Tribal immunity is one of the few tools that
Native Nations have to encourage economic security for their communities. It
should be maintained not only because legislative history and court doctrines
around tribal immunity heavily favor its maintenance, but also because it
operates to express continued commitment by the federal government to repair
Native economies and communities.
The reparative nature of tribal immunity justifies the respect that it is given
in the law because it creates a sense of fairness that is integral to a society’s
respect and admiration for the law. This is especially true in the case of
traditionally disenfranchised communities. Traditionally disenfranchised
communities may inherently distrust the operation of law because of the way
that it is manipulated against them. In these scenarios, fairness is an important
consideration because the principle of fairness enhances a given community’s
well-being in feeling that the law is a just system that the community can prosper
under.266
Fairness is a tricky concept because it changes depending on who is
consulted. For example, in a contract between a Native Nation and a non-Native
business, two distinct opinions of fairness are present. The Native Nation is
likely to say that the maintenance of its tribal immunity in its dealings with the
non-Native business is fair as a source of reparations for years of trauma incurred
by the federal government. The non-Native business will likely argue that a
revocation of tribal immunity would be fair so that both parties have the same
risk of lawsuit if they fail to uphold their end of the contract. In such a situation,
which opinion is inherently fairer? Because of the policy of tribal immunity as
reparations and welfare for Native people, the former interpretation is inherently
fairer. It is inherently better policy for the nation because “whenever a notion of
fairness leads one to choose a different rule from that favored under welfare
economics, everyone is necessarily worse off as a result.”267 By promoting the
success of a traditionally socially disenfranchised group through the law, the law
266
267
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becomes inherently fairer by creating a more even playing field and therefore a
greater sense of equality for all of those that it applies to. Conserving tribal
immunity is therefore good policy in that it expresses a fairer version of the law
by promoting native success.
Understanding tribal immunity as a reparative action is also good policy
under the remedial purpose canon. The remedial purpose canon states that
statutes should be more liberally construed when the statute has a remedial
purpose.268 For example, in International Brotherhood of Painters & Allied
Trades Union, a union sued an employer for failure to contribute to its
employees’ pension plans, contrary to collective bargaining agreement that it
had engaged in with the union.269 The court found in favor of the union and
depended, in part, on a liberal reading of ERISA’s remedial purpose to protect
employees in order to reach this decision.270 Given that the statutes––chiefly, the
Indian Reorganization Act––that grant sovereignty and sovereign immunity to
Native Nations are a reparative effort on behalf of Congress, all subsequent
readings of law involving those reparative efforts should be read liberally in
favor of the preservation of Native sovereignty and the privileges associated
with it.
The law also expresses social norms in that it creates focal points from which
parties may contract.271 That is to say that the law gives parties a variety of
central points from which to begin contracting and creating deals. These focal
points resolve immediate disputes and address future issues by giving parties a
place to begin which serves as a benefit to both parties.272 There is concern that
allowing tribal immunity within the context of section 106 of the Code will be
unfair for creditors of Native corporations because they will meet the unforeseen
consequence of being unable to collect if the Native Nation defaults in
bankruptcy payments. However, by defining the focal point from which parties
begin to contract, there is no risk of this, because any creditor who engages in
business with Native Nations will understand that the Nation may be able to
claim tribal immunity in any future bankruptcy proceeding and should plan
accordingly. This consideration should be included in any future contracting,
and liens may be attached accordingly to make contracts more appealing. Once
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See SEC v. CM Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344, 353 (1943); Niagara Mohawk Power Co. v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 596 F.3d 112, 132 (2d Cir. 2010).
269
Int’l Brotherhood of Painters & Allied Trades Union v. George A. Kracher Inc., 856 F.2d 1546 (D.C.
Cir. 1988).
270
Id.
271
McAdams, supra note 261, at 80.
272
McAdams, supra note 226, at 1049.

SANTANGELO_4.19.21

364

4/19/2021 10:33 AM

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 37

the reality of tribal immunity is known, contracts with Native Nations will shift
accordingly to center around this new defined focal point.
There is concern that Native Nations may manipulate this advantage to the
disadvantage of less knowledgeable businesses. This is a possibility. However,
there is a doctrine in criminal law that is applicable here: ignorance of the law is
no excuse. Contracting parties that engage in high stakes contracts should take
the time to understand the focal points from which their contracting begins.
Inevitably, “there is always a risk that those who wield power will use that power
to subordinate,” but this does not mean that power should not be granted in the
first place.273 All power carries with it the potential for corruption, but the
granting of a strong and solid tribal immunity doctrine to Native Nations
embraces concepts of fairness and justice.
CONCLUSION
Tribal immunity should not be abrogated in the context of section 106(a) of
the Code because the precedent around the revocation of tribal immunity
demands either a clear and unequivocal abrogation from Congress or a clear
intent to abrogate immunity from the Native Nation itself. Neither is present in
this case.
Many cases surrounding this issue have made these same legal arguments.
However, these arguments falter because they do not discuss and reflect upon
the history of tribal immunity and the reasons that it exists. In failing to do so,
they inherently weaken the doctrine. A discussion and reflection upon how and
why tribal immunity exists and why it is distinct from state sovereign immunity
is necessary because it demonstrates that the decision to maintain tribal
immunity in the context of the Code is in line with historical congressional
intent, and therefore continues to reinforce the power of tribal immunity. Tribal
immunity has been weakened in recent history by erasing the history of how it
came to be, and in doing so, painting tribal immunity as something that was
created without cause and that can be destroyed without cause.
Tribal immunity should not be abrogated in section 106 of the Code because
the legal precedent dictates that this would be a mistake and the history of the
relationship between Native Nations and the federal government demonstrates
that the federal government intended the renewal of Native sovereignty as a form
of reparations. Federal laws surrounding Native Nations demonstrate that
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Congress continually intends to encourage the economic growth of Native
societies by granting them autonomy that gives them economic privileges,
chiefly the privilege of sovereign immunity. Allowing the abrogation of tribal
immunity in section 106(a) would go against the established relationship that the
federal government currently has with Native peoples and would send a negative
message about the way that the United States treats disenfranchised
communities within its own borders.
The Supreme Court should grant certiorari to hear this case and should
clarify within the decision that tribal immunity should be maintained within
bankruptcy hearings; that section 106 of the Code does not abrogate sovereign
immunity for Native Nations.
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